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[1]

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Disagreement Recognized by Hiatt v. Union Pacific R. Co., D.Wyo.,
August 3, 1994

Under disparate impact theory, discrimination
can be established by proving that facially
neutral employment practice, which is
unjustified by legitimate business goal of
employer, has disproportionately adverse impact
on members of protected group. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

922 F.2d 766
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

Roderick MacPHERSON and Marvin Narz,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MONTEVALLO,
Defendant–Appellee.
No. 89–7752.
|
Jan. 30, 1991.
Professors brought action against university, alleging that
university discriminated against them with respect to their
compensation because of their age, in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
No. CV88–H–1341–S, James Hughes Hancock, J.,
directed verdict for university on professors’ disparate
impact claim, and after jury returned verdict for
professors on disparate treatment claim and awarded
damages, entered judgment notwithstanding verdict and,
in alternative, granted motion for new trial. Professors
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Edmondson, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) university’s desire to attract and hire
good new faculty members was legitimate business
reason for its alleged practice of paying market rates to
newly hired faculty members; (2) professors failed to
produce adequate alternative employment practice; (3)
whether reasons offered by university for salary
differential was pretext for age discrimination presented
question for jury on disparate treatment theory; but (4)
new trial was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for new
trial.

West Headnotes (13)

Civil Rights
Disparate impact

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
To make prima facie case of age discrimination
under disparate impact theory, plaintiff must
isolate and identify specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any
observed statistical disparities; for plaintiff to
show that there is an imbalance is not enough.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
12 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Once plaintiff has established prima facie case
of age discrimination under disparate impact
theory, burden shifts to employer to produce
evidence to justify its use of challenged practice
by showing that it serves, in significant way,
employer’s legitimate employment goals; while
employer bears burden of production on
business
justification,
burden
of
persuasion—and ultimate burden of proving that
alleged discrimination has been caused by
specific employment practice—remains on
plaintiff at all times. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
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U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
University’s need to pay market rates to attract
and to hire good new faculty members was
legitimate business reason for university’s
claimed practice of paying market rates to newly
hired faculty members but not to others, which
practice was alleged to have disparate impact on
older professors. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

11 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Civil Rights
Disparate impact
If employer successfully establishes that
challenged business practice significantly serves
employer’s legitimate employment goals,
plaintiff may still be able to prevail on claim of
age discrimination under disparate impact
theory if he can persuade fact finder that
alternative practice exists which would be
equally effective in meeting employer’s
legitimate goals without producing adverse
effect on protected group. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[5]

[7]

Civil Rights
Disparate impact

9 Cases that cite this headnote

Plaintiff in disparate impact suit bears some
burden of proving that plaintiff’s suggested
alternative practice is no more expensive than
employer’s current practice, or—at the very
least—that practice is economically feasible for
employer. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq.

Federal Civil Procedure
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Cases that cite this headnote

Despite practice of having shifting burdens of
production in employment discrimination cases,
grants of directed verdicts for defendants at
close of plaintiff’s evidence are proper even if
plaintiff has made out prima facie case as long
as plaintiff’s case-in-chief also contains
evidence sufficient to meet defendant’s burden
of production and evidence overall at close of
plaintiff’s case is insufficient to allow rational
jury to find for plaintiff. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
15 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
Disparate impact

[8]

Civil Rights
Disparate impact
Professors claiming that university’s charged
practice of paying market rates to only newly
hired faculty was age discriminatory under
disparate impact theory failed to present
adequate alternative practice that would meet
university’s legitimate goals of attracting and
hiring good new faculty members without
producing adverse effect on protected group,
where sole evidence produced at trial of
alternative employment practice was testimony
that obvious alternative was to pay market rates
to everybody, without any indication as to
whether to do so would be economically
possible. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
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seq.

discriminatory motive arising from professors’
prima facie case of age discrimination, by
introducing evidence indicating that starting
salaries, based on nondiscriminatory market
rates, led to any observed disparities, that
starting salaries reflected current market rate for
particular field of discipline, that evaluation
scores had little effect on salaries, that plaintiff
professors were in lower paying fields, and that
plaintiff professors failed to do significant
research and publication. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Prima facie case that plaintiffs would have to
prove in case of age discrimination in
compensation would be that they were members
of protected age group, that they received low
wages, that similarly situated persons outside
protected age group received higher wages, and
that they were qualified to receive higher wages.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

8 Cases that cite this headnote

[12]

42 Cases that cite this headnote

[10]

Whether legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
put forth by university for compensation
disparity were pretext for age discrimination
presented question for jury, in view of evidence
presented casting doubt on university’s claims
that faculty evaluations had little to do with
annual raises, that market-based starting salaries
were cause of salary differentials, and that
differentials were caused by disparities in
training
and
published
works.
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Professors established prima facie case of age
discrimination in their compensation from
university, where both professors were in their
early fifties, and presented evidence that they
were poorly compensated compared to most
other members of business school faculty, that
younger faculty members received greater
compensation, and that their evaluations were in
same range as other faculty members. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[11]

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
University
articulated
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for disparity in
compensation, rebutting presumption of

Civil Rights
Questions of law or fact

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[13]

Federal Civil Procedure
Weight of evidence
District court acted within its discretion in
granting new trial in professors’ age
discrimination action against university based
upon its belief that verdict for professors was
against weight of evidence, its concerns about
relevance of evidence submitted under disparate
impact theory to disparate treatment theory,
likelihood of jury confusion, and its perception
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that expert testimony presented by professors
dealt largely with fairness of university’s
treatment of professors, as opposed to whether
university committed age discrimination. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

trial. MacPherson and Narz appeal the directed verdict
against them on the disparate impact theory and the grant
of defendant’s motion for j.n.o.v./new trial. We affirm the
directed verdict for the University on the disparate impact
theory. On the disparate treatment theory, we vacate
j.n.o.v. for the University but affirm the district court’s
grant of new trial.

11 Cases that cite this headnote

I. BACKGROUND
Attorneys and Law Firms
*768 Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Franklin G. Shuler, Jr.,
Jeremiah A. Collins, Cooper, Mitch, Crawford,
Kuykendall & Whatley, Birmingham, Ala., John M.
West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Carl E. Johnson,
defendant-appellee.

Jr.,

Birmingham,

Ala.,

for

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama.
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and
RE*, Chief Judge.
Opinion
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Roderick S. MacPherson and Marvin J. Narz,
plaintiffs below, appeal the district court’s disposition of
their age discrimination suit against the University of
Montevallo (the “University”) brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The complaint alleged that the
University had discriminated against them with respect to
their compensation because of their age, and sought
damages, injunctive *769 relief, and litigation costs and
expenses, including attorney’s fees.1 The case was tried
before a jury; and at the close of plaintiffs’ case, the
district court directed a verdict for defendant on one of
plaintiffs’ theories, disparate impact. The jury returned a
verdict for plaintiffs on the disparate treatment theory and
awarded damages, but the district court entered judgment
not withstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) for defendants and,
in the alternative, granted defendant’s motion for new

The University is a small state institution of higher
education. The plaintiffs MacPherson and Narz are
full-time associate professors of its College of Business.2
MacPherson—who was born in 1937 and has a doctorate
in marketing—started teaching at the University in 1973
as an assistant professor, was tenured in 1978, and was
promoted to associate professor in 1981. Narz—who was
born in 1936, has an undergraduate degree in accounting,
is a Certified Public Accountant, and has a J.D.
degree—started teaching at the University in 1978 as an
associate professor; he is a professor of business law but
has also taught accounting and taxation.3 With the
exception of one professor hired after the start of this
litigation, plaintiffs are the oldest faculty members of the
College of Business. They are also the longest-serving
members of the faculty.4 Nevertheless, MacPherson and
Narz are the lowest paid members of the College of
Business faculty, with the exception of an assistant
professor who holds only an MBA (which is not
considered a terminal degree) and an assistant professor
who was hired in 1988 and does not have a Ph.D.
In 1979, Dr. William Word was hired as the Dean of the
College of Business with a mandate from the University
to obtain accreditation for the College of Business by the
American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business
(“A.A.C.S.B.”).5 His evaluation of the College of
Business led to the conclusion that, to obtain
accreditation, the University would need—among other
things—to hire doctorally qualified6 professors in
accounting, finance, and management.7 Since his
appointment as dean, Word has hired 25 new faculty
members, 17 under the age of 40 and 8 over the age *770
of 40, for the purpose of achieving accreditation.
According to defendant, this was necessary to obtain a
sufficient number of doctorally qualified professors in
the various business school fields and to obtain
professors who are researchers and publishers of articles.8
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A faculty member’s compensation at the University is
determined by the level of his beginning salary and raises
realized through promotion, across-the-board increases,
merit raises, and market adjustment increases. When
additional funds become available for business school
salaries (apart from promotion and market adjustment
salary allotments), 70 per cent of the new money is
distributed in across-the-board raises and 30 per cent is
distributed in merit raises according to a formula based on
the faculty member’s annual evaluation score as
compared to the average evaluation score in the College
of Business. According to Dean Word, salary differentials
based on merit raises are insignificant because the range
of evaluation scores is not great. A faculty member’s
starting salary is based on a number of market-related
variables which affect an applicant’s desirability and,
hence, the salary that universities are willing to offer the
applicant. The main factor affecting a faculty member’s
initial salary is his field or discipline. After field or
discipline, an applicant’s research and publication records
(and potential for additional publication) are the most
important variables in determining his initial salary, in
Dean Word’s opinion.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The standard of review we employ in reviewing the
district court’s disposition of a motion for directed verdict
or for j.n.o.v. is the same as that used by the district court
to determine whether to grant either motion. District and
appellate courts should consider all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and with all
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmover.
Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041,
1044–45 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman,
411 F.2d 365, 374–75 (5th Cir.1969)). If the facts and
inferences are so strong that the court believes that
reasonable persons in the exercise of impartial judgment
could not arrive at a contrary verdict, the district court
properly grants a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. Id. at 1045. If,
however, the evidence is such that “reasonable and
fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions,” it is improper for the
district court to grant a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. Id.
Motions for new trial are within the sound discretion of
the district court. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78
L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Thus, an appellate court employs the
abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s
ruling on a motion for a new trial. Verbraeken, 881 F.2d
at 1049. As we stated in Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure
Products, Inc., this standard “recognizes the deference
that is due the trial court’s first-hand experience of the
witnesses, their demeanor, and a context of the trial.” 827
F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.1987). But we have also
recognized that “we should more strictly scrutinize orders
which grant new trials, where the basis for the order is
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (as
opposed to situations where there is new evidence, for
example).” Id. (emphasis in original). The concern is that
“the [trial] judge does not simply substitute his judgment
for that of the jury, thus depriving the litigants of their
right to trial by jury.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION
A. The Disparate Impact Theory
Appellants’ disparate impact theory of discrimination is
that the University’s alleged practice of paying market
rates of salary to new faculty hires, but not paying the
market rate to incumbent professors, has a disparate
impact on older people because *771 they tend to be the
faculty members who have been at the University the
longest. They contend that, because the University had
not carried its burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for this alleged practice, the district court
erred in granting a directed verdict at the conclusion of
plaintiffs’ evidence.
[1]

Under disparate impact theory, discrimination can be
established by proving that a facially neutral employment
practice, which is unjustified by a legitimate business goal
of the employer, has a disproportionately adverse impact
on the members of a protected group. Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655–56, 109
S.Ct. 2115, 2124, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989). It was
developed “as a form of pretext analysis to handle
specific employment practices not obviously job-related.”
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 707
(9th Cir.1984).
[2]

To make a prima facie case under the disparate impact
theory, a plaintiff must isolate and identify “the specific
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employment practices that are allegedly responsible for
any observed statistical disparities.” Wards Cove, 490
U.S. at 656, 109 S.Ct. at 2124 (quoting Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 994, 108 S.Ct.
2777, 2788, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988)). The Supreme Court
has said that causation is an important part of the
disparate impact prima facie case: “a plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or
particular employment practice that has created the
disparate impact under attack.” Id. at 657, 109 S.Ct. at
2124. For a plaintiff to show that there is an imbalance is
not enough. Id. at 657, 109 S.Ct. at 2124.
[3]

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to
produce evidence to justify its use of the challenged
practice.9 When considering the employer’s justification,
“the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer.” Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659, 109
S.Ct. at 2125–26. An insubstantial justification will not
suffice in this analysis, but “there is no requirement that
the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to
the employer’s business for it to pass muster.” Id. at 659,
109 S.Ct. at 2126. While the employer bears the burden of
production on its business justification, the burden of
persuasion—and the ultimate burden of proving that the
alleged discrimination has been caused by a specific
employment practice—remains on the plaintiff at all
times. Id. at 659, 109 S.Ct. at 2126.
[4]

If an employer successfully establishes that the
challenged business practice significantly serves the
employer’s legitimate employment goals, a plaintiff may
still be able to prevail if he can persuade the factfinder
that an alternative practice exists which would meet the
employer’s legitimate goals without producing an adverse
effect on the protected group. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659, 109 S.Ct. at 2126. If the employer refuses to adopt
the alternatives, the refusal “would belie [the employer’s
claim] that their incumbent practices are being employed
for nondiscriminatory reasons.” Id. at 660–61, 109 S.Ct.
at 2126–27. But, the Supreme Court has indicated that
just suggesting an alternative practice is insufficient to
meet the plaintiff’s burden: the alternative practice “must
be equally effective as [the employer’s chosen practice] in
achieving [its] legitimate employment goals.” Id. at 661,
109 S.Ct. at 2127. The burdens imposed on the
employer—including cost—by the alternative practices
are “relevant in determining whether they would be
equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving

the employer’s legitimate business goals.” Id. at 661, 109
S.Ct. at 2127 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 998, 108 S.Ct.
at 2790).
*772 [5] [6] We conclude that the district court properly
granted the University’s motion for directed verdict on the
disparate impact theory at the close of plaintiffs’ case.10
First, we doubt that reasonable jurors could find that the
University had a practice or policy of paying market rates
to newly-hired faculty members but not to others.11
Plaintiffs did establish that the University has a practice
of paying market rates to newly-hired professors; they
may not, however, have shown that the University has a
practice of not providing market-based adjustments to the
salaries of established professors. As MacPherson
admitted, the University provides special salary
adjustments—beyond
across-the-board
and
merit
raises—which are given for market reasons. He also
admitted to having received such a market adjustment in
1981 or 1982; Narz also received a market adjustment at
that time. Dean Word, called as a witness by plaintiffs,
testified regarding market adjustments to salaries, which
he said were based on the faculty member’s specialty or
discipline. To illustrate, he used the market adjustments
granted in the 1988–1989 school year: in that school year,
he gave market adjustments to three Ph.D.s in the
accounting field and to two management professors who
had computer training; he stated that adjustments for
market conditions are “primarily based upon discipline.
Whether one is in accounting, finance, et cetera. And how
difficult it is to get these people and how much
adjustment money [he] think[s he] can free up.” In other
words, the University’s market adjustments are made to
enable it to retain good professors in fields in which
professors are in great demand.
We do not, however, base our decision in this case on our
doubt as to whether plaintiffs sufficiently proved the
practice they alleged. Assuming, for the sake of
discussion, that plaintiffs established that the University
has a practice of paying market rates to newly-hired
faculty members but not to others, and that this practice
has a disparate impact on older professors, we still agree
with the district court’s direction of the verdict on the
disparate impact theory. MacPherson and Narz presented
evidence tending to suggest that a practice of paying
market-rate salaries only to new hires had disparate
impact on older professors who were likely to have been
at the University longer. But, the University’s contention
that there was a legitimate business reason for this
practice—that the University had to pay market rates to
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attract and to hire good new faculty members—was
undisputed by plaintiffs and admitted by plaintiffs’ expert,
Dr. Ignatin, on cross-examination. The University thus
established, through uncontroverted evidence, that there
was a legitimate business reason for this employment
practice; no reasonable juror could find otherwise.
[7]

situation”; that the University is in a poorer financial
situation than public universities in other states; that “a lot
of years we don’t get raises at all”; and that, financially,
“it is pretty tight.” Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the existence
of an equally effective, financially feasible, alternative
practice that a rational jury could accept.

[8]

The sole evidence that MacPherson and Narz
produced at trial for an alternative employment practice
which would avoid the alleged disparate impact on older
professors was Dr. Ignatin’s testimony that “[t]he
obvious alternative is you can pay market rates to
everybody.” R. 3–376. The district court concluded, as we
read what the judge said when he orally granted the
University’s motion for directed verdict, that this sole
statement was insufficient *773 to meet plaintiffs’ burden
to prove an alternative.12 We agree.
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court showed that to meet
plaintiffs’ burden under a disparate impact theory,
plaintiffs have to do more than suggest an alternative
practice. The Court said that “any alternative practice ...
must be equally effective as [the employer’s chosen
practice] in achieving [its] legitimate employment goals.”
490 U.S. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127. It indicated that one of
the factors to be considered in determining whether the
alternative is equally effective is the cost the alternative
imposes on the employer. Id. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127.
Because “ ‘[c]ourts are generally less competent than
employers to restructure business practices,’ ... the
judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that
an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s alternative
[employment practice].” Id. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127
(quoting Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)).
From this, we infer that the plaintiff in a disparate impact
suit bears some burden of proving that plaintiff’s
suggested alternative practice is no more expensive than
the employer’s current practice, or—at the very
least—that the practice is economically feasible for the
employer.
Plaintiffs in this case never presented evidence to show
that requiring the University to pay the A.A.C.S.B.
“market rate” to longer-serving professors is
economically possible for the University.13 The evidence
which was presented during plaintiffs’ case suggests that
such an alternative is infeasible. Both Dean Word and
plaintiff MacPherson indicated that salaries had been
frozen twice for periods of one year. In addition, Dean
Word testified that the University is “in a limited budget

Assuming that plaintiffs adequately proved the alleged
two-part practice (paying new hires at market rates and
not paying others at market rates) of the University, we
affirm the district court’s decision to direct the verdict on
the disparate impact claim for defendant University based
on plaintiffs’ failure to present an equally effective,
alternative practice in the light of the University’s proof
of a legitimate business justification for its practice of
paying new hires at market rates of compensation.14

B. The Disparate Treatment Theory
1. The Grant of J.N.O.V.
MacPherson and Narz contend that the district court erred
in granting j.n.o.v. to *774 the University on plaintiffs’
claim of age discrimination based on the disparate
treatment theory because the record is such that a
reasonable jury could have concluded that the University
intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of
their age.
Unlike the disparate impact model of discrimination,
“disparate treatment cases necessarily require direct or
circumstantial proof of discriminatory motive, whereas no
such proof is required in disparate impact cases.”
Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 700; see also AFSCME v. State of
Washington, 770 F.2d at 1405. A plaintiff employing
circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination—by a
preponderance of the evidence—using the four-part test
of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Carter v. City of
Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir.1989). If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden then shifts to the defendant employer “to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the
employer’s action. Then, if the defendant employer meets
that burden, the plaintiff must show by the preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant’s legitimate reasons
were not the reasons that actually motivated its conduct,
that the reasons were merely a “pretext for
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discrimination.” See Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). We have stated before that,
at this last stage, the plaintiff must establish “by
significantly probative evidence that the proffered reason
is a pretext for discrimination.” Carter, 870 F.2d at 584.
[9]

This Circuit has adopted a modified version of the
McDonnell Douglas test to allow ADEA plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with
circumstantial evidence. The prima facie case that
plaintiffs would have to prove in this case of age
discrimination in compensation would be that (1) they
are members of the protected group of persons between
the ages of 40 and 70; (2) they received low wages; (3)
similarly situated persons outside the protected age group
received higher wages;15 and (4) they were qualified to
receive the higher wages. See Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at
1045.
[10]

Here, plaintiffs established a prima facie case of age
discrimination. In 1988, MacPherson and Narz were
both in their early fifties. Plaintiffs presented evidence
that, compared to most members of the College of
Business faculty, they were poorly compensated. Their
expert, Dr. George Ignatin, did a comparator analysis of
their 1988 salaries.16 He compared MacPherson, an
associate professor in marketing with Professors Mikan
and Hamilton, assistant professors of management,17 both
of whom were younger than he was and had less
experience teaching; Ignatin found that MacPherson was
paid less than Mikan and Hamilton. Ignatin compared
Narz, an associate professor of business law/accounting,
with Professors Rovelstad and Ryerson, younger
assistant professors of accounting.18 Narz was paid
significantly less than they were. Plaintiffs also produced
evidence regarding their evaluations, which were in the
same range as the professors to whom they were
compared: MacPherson’s average evaluation over an
eight-year period was 3.82 compared to Mikan’s 3.75 and
Hamilton’s 3.91; Narz’s *775 evaluation average was
3.79, as compared to Rovelstad’s 3.90 and Ryerson’s
3.97.
[11]

To rebut the presumption of discriminatory motive
that arises when an ADEA plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case, the employer has “to articulate a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason” for its actions. See Carter,
870 F.2d at 584; Young, 840 F.2d at 830. The employer
must present “evidence which ‘raises a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.’ ”

Stanfield v. Answering Service, Inc., 867 F.2d 1290, 1294
(11th Cir.1989) (quoting Archambault v. United
Computing Sys., Inc., 786 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th
Cir.1986) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct.
1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207)).
The University presented legitimate non-discriminatory
reasons for the disparities in salaries and presented
evidence which called into question the evidence offered
by plaintiffs. The University introduced evidence
indicating
that
starting
salaries,
based
on
non-discriminatory market rates, led to any observed
disparities; thus, increases in compensation were not
responsible for these disparities. The University also
stressed that starting salaries reflect the current market
rate for the particular field or discipline, with accounting
paying the most and business law paying the least.19 In
addition, the University presented evidence through the
testimony of Dean Word that the evaluation scores—on
which plaintiffs put emphasis—have little effect on
salaries, apart from merit increases which represent only a
small portion of post-hire salary increases. The University
also cast doubt on the comparator analysis presented by
plaintiffs. Dr. Ignatin admitted that the set of professors
“show a lot of non-comparability”; that there are “some
remarkable
noncomparabilities”
in
terms
of
field/discipline, degree, and salary range; and that
plaintiffs are “obviously not equivalent” to the people
with whom they were compared.
The comparator analysis of MacPherson crossed two
steps (rank and field) and neglected to examine the salary
of another associate professor of marketing who was just
four years younger than MacPherson and is well
compensated. In addition, the University produced
evidence that Mikan and Hamilton had management
information system (M.I.S.) skills and that their salaries
were established in the light of that training and their
M.I.S. credentials because of the University’s need for
such skills in the A.A.C.S.B. accreditation process. On the
comparator analysis of Narz, the University showed that
Narz’s field of business law is the lowest paying field in
the College of Business while the compared field of
accounting is the highest. The University suggested that
Narz could not be considered half in the accounting
field—despite the fact that he taught some accounting
courses—because A.A.C.S.B. requirements dictate that in
order to be considered qualified to teach any course in a
given field, the professor has to be doctorally qualified,
that is, the professor must hold a terminal degree in that
field, which Narz does not. Moreover, the University
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presented testimony indicating that both MacPherson and
Narz have failed to do significant research and
publication, thus explaining part of the salary
differentials. The University also presented the testimony
of Dr. Baker, its expert economist, who stated that in
doing a comparator analysis, an individual must be
matched with persons having similar job-related
characteristics who were similarly situated. She
concluded that there were not enough similarly situated
faculty members at the College of Business to do a
comparator analysis.
[12]

Because the University pointed out legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for the salary differentials,
plaintiffs were required to show, by “significantly
probative evidence,” that the proffered reasons were
merely a pretext for discrimination. Carter, 870 F.2d at
584. Plaintiffs could do so “either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation *776 is unworthy of
credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095;
Carter, 870 F.2d at 584.
Certain evidence presented at trial by plaintiffs can be
fairly said to cast a doubt on the University’s proffered
reasons for salary differentials and could be viewed by a
reasonable jury as showing that the University’s proffered
explanations are unworthy of belief. Plaintiffs drew
testimony from Dean Word that the annual raises are
based on the evaluations of the professors, casting doubt
on the University’s assertions that evaluations have little
to do with annual raises. About the University’s
explanation that market-based starting salaries are the
cause of salary differentials, plaintiffs presented evidence
that Mikan and Hamilton, to whom MacPherson was
compared, were hired at salaries below MacPherson’s
contemporaneous salary, but have gradually surpassed
him in compensation. While Ryerson, to whom Narz was
compared, started at a salary approximately the same as
Narz’s contemporaneous salary, Ryerson now earns
significantly more; the rate of salary increase for
Rovelstad, who was hired at a higher salary than Narz’s
contemporaneous salary, was greater than the rate at
which Narz’s salary increased. Evidence also showed that
MacPherson was making less than younger, less senior
professors in an academic field in which salary levels
were virtually identical to his field and that this
differential occurred after Mikan and Hamilton were
hired, making it unlikely that the differential occurred
because of their M.I.S. training (a factor that would

explain an initial salary differential, but not subsequent
discrepancies).20 In addition, plaintiffs presented evidence
that the professors to whom MacPherson and Narz were
compared had produced little in the way of publications;
thus, salary differentials could not be explained by raises
based on the publishing of articles. On the University’s
characterization of Narz as a business law professor,
evidence showed that he was hired as an accounting
professor and only later began to teach business law
courses.
We conclude that there is “evidence of such quality and
weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise
of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.”
See Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at 1045. The evidence
presented by plaintiffs is sufficient to allow a jury in the
exercise of impartial judgment to conclude that the
University’s proffered explanations are unworthy of
belief. Therefore, we hold that the district court erred in
granting j.n.o.v. to the defendant University, and we
vacate that judgment.

2. The Alternative Grant of a New Trial.
[13]
Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its
discretion in its alternative grant of new trial. They say
that the district court’s belief that the jury was confused
by the disparate impact evidence was based on an
erroneous view of the law and the record and results in
the court’s simply substituting its judgment for that of the
jury. They also contend that the district court’s view that
the jury was confused about the law or misled by
sympathy rests on speculation.
The district court based its conditional grant of new trial
on several reasons. It thought that “the verdict was a
result of confusion on the part of the jury (perhaps
engendered by the major thrust of the plaintiffs’
evidentiary presentation which was devoted to the
disparate impact claims), if not expressly the result of
sympathy or bias.” Memorandum of Decision at 2 n. 1
(emphasis in original). The district court also believed
that a new trial should be granted so that “evidentiary
rulings could be made without there being in the case
claims predicated upon disparate impact.” Id. at 4. In
addition, the trial judge was concerned about the
testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Ignatin, whose
“presentation of evidence on issues of liability was largely
devoted to (a) disparate *777 impact analysis and (b)
what he felt was fair and unfair.” Id.
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We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for new
trial under the abuse of discretion standard because
“deference [ ] is due the trial court’s first-hand experience
of the witnesses, their demeanor, and a context of the
trial.” Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1498. Plaintiffs contend that
we should look more strictly at this grant of a new trial,
implying that the basis for the order is the judge’s view
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. But
we believe that the grant of a new trial in this case was
based on considerably more than the premise that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
While the district court did believe that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence—and granted
j.n.o.v.—its grant of a new trial was based on additional
concerns about the relevance of evidence (admitted under
the disparate impact theory) to the disparate treatment
theory; the likelihood that the jury was confused by the
plaintiffs’ arguments and evidence admitted on the
disparate impact theory which was no longer relevant to
case;21 and the court’s perception that Dr. Ignatin’s
testimony, which mainly focused on the disparate impact
theory, dealt a great deal with the fairness of the
University’s treatment of plaintiffs, as opposed to whether
the University committed age discrimination against
them.22 Because deference is due the district court’s
first-hand experience of the evidence, the witnesses, and

the jury in the context of trial, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion; and we affirm the grant of a
new trial on the disparate treatment theory of age
discrimination.

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s action in directing the
verdict on the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
vacate the grant of j.n.o.v. on the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination, and affirm the district court’s
conditional grant of a new trial on the disparate treatment
theory. Therefore, we remand the case for new trial.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED
REMANDED for new trial.

in

part;

and

All Citations
922 F.2d 766, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 13, 55
Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,539, 59 USLW 2502, 65 Ed. Law
Rep. 68

Footnotes
*

Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

1

Plaintiffs based their age discrimination case on two different theories: disparate impact and disparate treatment.
Briefly stated, the disparate impact theory of discrimination is that the employer uses some facially neutral,
non-job-related employment practice which has a disproportionately adverse effect upon the members of a protected
group. The disparate treatment theory is that the employer intends to discriminate against the members of a protected
group and does so.

2

The faculty ranks at the University (lowest to highest) are instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and full
professor. Most of the hiring is done at the assistant professor level, at which level the University may hire a person
with a master’s degree (M.S.), a person who has completed the course work for a doctorate but has not completed his
dissertation (A.B.D.), or a person who has finished his dissertation and has a doctorate (Ph.D. or D.B.A.).

3

In July 1989, he received an LL.M. in taxation.

4

Another professor hired at the same time as Narz has served as long as Narz.

5

The University has indicated that the A.A.C.S.B. is a prestigious institution which accredits select schools of business.
A.A.C.S.B. accreditation enhances the ability of a school of business to raise funds, to attract faculty and students, and
to place students upon graduation.
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6

For purposes of A.A.C.S.B. accreditation standards, a professor is doctorally qualified if he holds a terminal degree in
his teaching field. Such a professor is deemed qualified to teach any course within his field, regardless of the courses
he actually teaches.

7

One of the reasons for A.A.C.S.B.’s no-visit response to the College of Business’s first application for accreditation in
1983–84 was that the College of Business lacked a sufficient number of doctorally qualified professors in accounting
and management. Another reason was the faculty’s lack of research and publication.

8

These accreditation efforts came to fruition in 1987 when the University became the smallest public university in the
United States to have a nationally accredited business program.

9

When one speaks of a prima facie case in the employment discrimination context, what is ordinarily meant is that
enough has been shown to require defendant to produce some evidence. Halsell v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 683 F.2d
285, 291 (8th Cir.1982); see also Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521–22 & n. 10 (5th Cir.1982) (prima
facie case only creates rebuttable presumption and shifts burden to defendant to produce evidence).

10

Despite the practice of having shifting burdens of production in employment discrimination cases, grants of directed
verdicts for defendants at the close of plaintiff’s evidence are proper even if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case as long as plaintiff’s case-in-chief also contains evidence sufficient to meet defendant’s burden of production and
the evidence overall at the close of plaintiff’s case is insufficient to allow a rational jury to find for the plaintiff. See
Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir.1987); Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty., Ind., 724
F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir.1983); Halsell, 683 F.2d at 291–92; Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533–34 (9th Cir.1981);
see also Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828–29 (11th Cir.1988) (“the fact that a plaintiff has established
a prima facie case does not in and of itself foreclose the possibility of summary judgment being granted in favor of the
employer”).

11

Plaintiffs rely on A.A.C.S.B. salary scales to establish the “market rates” for the average faculty member at a certain
rank in a given discipline or field.

12

The district court also concluded that this evidence did not prove the existence of an alternative to the recruitment
practice of paying market rates to new hires, but only provided a remedy for the alleged disparate impact of this
practice. Because we find that the evidence was insufficient to meet plaintiffs’ burden to prove an equally effective
alternative, we do not reach this issue.

13

Therefore, we need not decide today whether an alternative practice that is economically feasible but is still more
expensive than the employer’s current practice can be “equally effective” within the meaning of Wards Cove.

14

Because we find that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under a disparate impact theory of age discrimination, we
have assumed—without deciding—that a disparate impact claim of age discrimination can be made where (as here)
plaintiffs allege a practice that encompasses more than one point in the employment process. But see American Fed.
of State, County, & Mun. Employees [AFSCME] v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985)
(“[d]isparate impact analysis is confined to cases that challenge a specific, clearly delineated employment practice
applied at a single point in the job selection process”). We have also assumed—without deciding—that a disparate
impact claim of age discrimination can be made where (as here) plaintiffs allege a practice which is based on the
market. But see Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686 (rejecting disparate impact theory of sex discrimination where employees
received disparate compensation for work of subjectively equal value to employer but which do not command equal
prices in market); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.1980) (same); AFSCME v. State of
Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (same).

15

This part is treated with some flexibility. In some circuits, a plaintiff in a similar age discrimination case would only
need to establish that a similarly situated younger person (including a younger person within the protected age group)
received higher wages. See Carter, 870 F.2d at 582 n. 11 & 583 n. 14.

16

In a comparator analysis, the plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who have very similar job-related
characteristics and who are in a similar situation to determine if the plaintiff has been treated differently than others
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who are similar to him.
17

Associate professors outrank assistant professors. Although the fields of management and marketing are close with
regard to salary scales, marketing professors, during most of the period at issue, commanded slightly higher salaries.

18

In terms of salary scales, the field of accounting is at the top of the business school salary range and business law is at
the bottom.

19

The order of the fields or disciplines from highest paying to lowest paying is: accounting, finance, economics,
marketing, management, and business law.

20

Evidence also showed that during the first semester that Hamilton taught M.I.S., he was eliminated from teaching it in
the future.

21

This confusion is especially important given that the district court itself indicated confusion between disparate impact
and disparate treatment and that the court declined to instruct the jury that the court had directed a verdict on the
disparate impact theory and that the jury should ignore evidence presented regarding that theory.

22

The district court stated, during the course of the trial, its impression that Dr. Ignatin “comes across quite frankly very
heavy on what is fair in the labor movement, labor market. We are dealing here with what could be grossly unfair
payment and wage scale.”

End of Document

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/55
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1707

12

12

